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ARGUMENT
I.

THE SMITHS IGNORE THE STANDARD FOR 12(b)(6) MOTIONS
TO DISMISS
The Smiths argue that since "all of LPM's arguments rely upon facts which

do not appear in its complaint,.. .these facts are not relevant on appeal." (Aplee.
Brief at 8) That conclusion is false because the argument ignores the correct
standard of review.
When this Court reviews a trial court's decision to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, it "accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and interprets
those facts and all inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff as the non-moving party." Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004
UT 101, f 9, 104 P.3d 1226, 1230. "A motion to dismiss is appropriate only where
it clearly appears that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under.. .any state
of facts [the plaintiff] could prove to support [its] claim." Sony Electronics, Inc. v.
Reber, 2004 UT App 420, flO, 103 P. 3d 186 (citations and quotations omitted)
(emphasis added). Thus, under the correct standard this Court considers 1) the facts
in the complaint, 2) reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, and 3) any other
state of facts LPM could prove to support it boundary by acquiescence claim.
The Smiths' argument addresses only the first point of the standard, ignoring
points two and Ihree. They argue that any fact outside the complaint should be

disregarded by the Court. But under the applicable standard of review, reasonable
inferences drawn from LPM's complaint and other facts LPM could prove to
support its claim are just as relevant as facts alleged in the complaint. Therefore, the
Court must consider them as well.

II.

LPM'S COMPLAINT STATES A VALID CLAIM BECAUSE IT
ALLEGES SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SUPPORT THE ELEMENTS OF
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE.
LPM alleged sufficient facts to support a valid claim of boundary by

acquiescence in its complaint. (See Aplt. Brief at I. A.) The Smiths do not challenge
the sufficiency of the alleged facts for any one particular element of the claim.
Their primary argument is that LPM fails to state a claim because "the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence is not a doctrine by which one can obtain an entire parcel
of land." (Aplee. Brief at 5) However, the only reason they offer in support of this
contention is that the alternative legal theory of adverse possession is somehow
"designed" to permit the taking of a neighbor's entire parcel1, but boundary by
acquiescence is not. (See Aplee. Brief at 7).

1 The Smiths are quick to point out that LPM cannot prove adverse possession because it has not
paid the taxes on the property. However, that is not relevant here because LPM did not plead
adverse possession. The payment of property taxes is not a required element under the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence. See RHN Corp. v. VeibelL 2004 UT 60, | 2 3 , 96 P.3d 935, 941 (Utah
2004). Therefore, non payment of taxes is not a bar to quieting title in a disputed parcel by
boundary by acquiescence. It is also a matter outside the pleadings and not supported by any
evidence.

LPM already advanced the argument that boundary by acquiescence can
operate to take a neighbor's entire parcel. (See Aplt. Brief at LB.) But, even if it
cannot, the complaint still states a claim because LPM is not claiming the Smiths'
entire parcel.
The Smiths confuse LPM's claim by mislabeling the disputed parcel as the
Smiths' "entire parcel." The disputed parcel is not the Smiths' entire property. The
Smiths' property consists of the disputed parcel and additional contiguous land on
the north side of the fence. [R 3 12, |9; R 70] Therefore, LPM seeks only a
boundary adjustment, not the smiths' entire property.
The Smiths erroneously conclude2 that since the complaint did not allege the
existence of the Smiths' undisputed parcel, that fact must be ignored and, thus, the
Smiths' undisputed parcel does not exist. If it does not exist, they reason, then the
Smiths' only property is the disputed parcel, and if LPM acquires it by boundary by
acquiescence, that would leave the Smiths no property at all. (See Aplee. Brief at 6)
The Smiths infer that because no reasonable landowner would acquiesce to having
no property, LPM's claim fails because it could never prove the required element of
acquiescence. (See Aplee. Brief at 8)
Of course, the Smiths' undisputed parcel to the north of the fence really does
exist. It also existed when the Smiths' predecessors owned it, along with the
2. Their conclusion is erroneous because the Smiths rely on the wrong standard of review for a 12(b)(6) motion.
1

disputed parcel, and acquiesced to the fence as their southern boundary. [R 319-10]
These facts were alleged in the complaint.
Paragraph nine of the complaint states "LPM, its predecessors in interest and
Defendant's predecessors in interest all acquiesced in the fence serving as the
boundary between their respective properties." [R 3 19 (emphasis added)] That
allegation unmistakably refers to the property on both sides of the fence.
Since the property directly north of the fence is owned by the Smiths, and the
complaint refers to it, the complaint refers to the Smiths' property north of the
fence. In paragraphs two and three respectively, the complaint also alleges two
other parcels: LPM's property and the disputed parcel. [R 3 12-3] Thus, LPM
alleged the disputed parcel was only a part of the Smiths' property, which included
additional property contiguous to LPM's property, separated by a fence between the
properties of LPM and the Smiths.
But even if LPM did not plead the Smiths' ownership of the land north of the
fence, the trial court must consider that fact because it is a reasonable inference
drawn from the facts alleged. Inherent in every boundary by acquiescence claim
are three distinct parcels of land: 1) the plaintiff s undisputed land, 2) the
defendant's undisputed land, which is separated from the record owner's property
by afixedboundary, and 3) the disputed land in the middle.

The Smiths distort this basic framework and mischaracterize LPM's claim in
the process. Under this framework, the defendant owns the land on the opposite
side of the fence that is not in dispute If the trial court did not draw this inference
on its own, LPM expressly raised it in its opposition memorandum [R 21], and
again at the hearing on the Smiths' motion to dismiss [R 70, R 95.7-8]. Therefore,
because it was a reasonable inference from the facts alleged that the disputed parcel
was only part of the Smiths' property, the district court was required to consider
that fact in its decision to dismiss LPM's complaint.
Even if not specifically plead or reasonably inferred from the facts alleged,
the trial court must consider the fact that the Smiths own the property north of the
fence because LPM could prove it. "[A] motion to dismiss is only appropriate
where it clearly appears that the plaintiff.. .would not be entitled to relief under the
facts alleged or any state of facts they could prove to support their claim." Sony
Electronics, 2004 UT App 420, |10, 103 P. 3d 186 (citations and quotations
omitted) (emphasis added).
LPM can prove the Smiths' ownership of the land north of and contiguous to
the disputed parcel. LPM made reference to the Smiths' deed at the hearing on the
motion to dismiss. [R 95.7] LPM also demonstrated the Smiths' ownership at the
hearing by presenting an exhibit of the Smiths' entire property conveyed by that
deed, including the portion north of the fence. [R 70] Because LPM demonstrated

that it could prove this fact, the trial court should, therefore, have considered it in its
decision to dismiss.
In conclusion, the disputed parcel is merely a portion of the Smiths' entire
parcel. LPM seeks only to adjust the legal boundary between LPM and the Smiths
northward to the fence line. Thus, LPM would not be taking the Smiths entire
property because the Smiths would still have title to their property north of the
fence. Under these circumstances, proving acquiescence is entirely possible and
conceivable. Therefore, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence applies here
because LPM does not seek to use it to obtain the Smiths' "entire parcel." Rather, it
is being properly employed to adjust a disputed boundary line.
If the Court were to adopt the Smiths' view of boundary by acquiescence, the
doctrine would become useless because such a claim could always be defeated by
the defendant land owner. If a land survey ever uncovered a boundary discrepancy,
a potential defendant landowner would simply need to deed the disputed parcel to
herself or a family member as a separate parcel. Then she would have a fail-proof
defense against her neighbor seeking to quiet title to the "entire parcel" under
boundary by acquiescence, which is exactly what the Smiths' predecessors in
interest did. That is why the Utah courts did have not adopted - and should not
adopt - the Smiths' view of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT CONVERTING THE
SMITHS' MOTION TO ONE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN
THE PARTIES RAISED MATTERS OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS
AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT EXCLUDE THEM.
The Smiths argue that it was not error when the district court failed to

convert the motion because it did not need to rely on the outside matters presented
by LPM in its decision to dismiss. (See Aplee. Brief at 3) However, the Smiths fail
to explain how the trial court could have dismissed without relying upon outside
matters. Nevertheless, the trial court did not exclude any of the additional matters
during the motion hearing, or otherwise. [R 95] Under Sony Electronics, the court
was required to consider additional facts that support LPM's claim.
The Smiths failed to address the matters that the Smiths presented outside the
pleadings. (See Aplt. Brief at 17) The record shows that the Smiths raised, for the
first time at the motion hearing, the fact that the disputed parcel was created in
1967. [R 95.3, 95.11, 95.13, 95.15] The Smiths also argued in their reply
memorandum and at the hearing, without offering any admissible evidence, that
they paid all of the taxes on the parcel. [R48, R 95.11, 95.13, 95.15] LPM was
prejudiced when the court relied upon those matters in dismissing its complaint.
Because Rule 12(b) required the trial court to treat the Smiths' motion as a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment, and it did not, the trial court erred.

7

CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence applies here because LPM seeks
merely to adjust the common boundary with the Smiths northward to the fence, not
take the Smiths' entire property. LPM alleged facts to support each required
element of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Therefore, the trial court
erred when it dismissed LPM's claim for failure to state a claim, and this Court
should reverse. Alternatively, this Court should reverse because LPM was denied
the opportunity to present material made pertinent to the 12(b)(6) motion after the
Smiths presented matters outside the pleadings.

DATED March 6, 2006.
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